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THE ELIMINATION OF MRE 803A? 
PEOPLE v. GURSKY AND ITS 
QUALIFICATION OF SPONTANEOUS 
STATEMENTS 
Cristina Roberti 
INTRODUCTION 
On multiple occasions in 2005 and 2006, Jason Gursky 
sexually molested his girlfriend’s daughter, who was six and 
seven years old at the time of the offenses.1 The police did not 
discover the sexual abuse until a close family friend of the 
victim’s mother (and the victim) questioned the young girl and 
asked “if anyone had been touching her.”2 When the young girl 
responded with detailed and specific answers, volunteering 
information as to how and when Gursky had sexually molested 
her, the family friend reported the abuse to the police.3 
Gursky’s conviction in July 20104 was the justice the young 
victim deserved. However, the court’s limitation on the usage 
of a hearsay exception5 created a major setback for child 
victims of sexual abuse, as the limitation introduced an 
                                                          
 J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2012; B.A. Boston College, 2009. I 
would like to thank my family for all of their love and support. Special 
thanks to Professor Frederic Bloom and Scott Krischke for their guidance. I 
would also like to thank the entire Journal of Law and Policy staff for all of 
their advice and assistance. 
1 People v. Gursky (Gursky II), 786 N.W.2d 579, 58283 (Mich. 2010). 
2 Id. at 583. 
3 Id. at 58384. 
4 Id. at 582, 597 (affirming defendant’s 2008 conviction of four counts 
of first-degree criminal sexual conduct for sexually abusing his girlfriend’s 
child). 
5 Id. at 591. 
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additional and significant hurdle to the successful prosecution 
of their abusers. 
While upholding defendant Gursky’s conviction, the 
Michigan Supreme Court held that the young victim’s statements 
to her family friend in 2006, when she had first disclosed the 
sexual abuse, were inadmissible as evidence because the child 
had not introduced the subject of sexual abuse.6 The court thus 
established that whenever a child does not broach the subject of 
sexual abuse, the child’s statements to an adult regarding the 
sexual abuse will not fall within Michigan Rule of Evidence 
(“MRE”) 803A, an exception to the hearsay rule that 
specifically applies in child sexual abuse cases.7 The Gursky 
court’s restriction of MRE 803A negates the rule’s very purpose 
of facilitating the prosecution of child sexual abuse cases.8 
Moreover, the court acted without justification for or foresight 
into the consequences of such a limiting interpretation. Had the 
court adequately balanced the state’s interest in the successful 
prosecution of child sexual abuse cases with the court’s interest 
in ensuring the reliability and trustworthiness of hearsay 
evidence presented at trial, such a limiting interpretation would 
not have emerged.9 
This Note argues that, given the unique nature of child 
sexual abuse cases, the court should use a totality of the 
circumstances approach that analyzes all of the child’s 
statements and the circumstances in which they were made, in 
order to determine admissibility. This approach more adequately 
serves to further the state’s interests without serving as an 
additional impediment to the prosecution of child sexual abuse 
cases. 
Part I of this Note addresses the various difficulties in 
prosecuting child sexual abuse cases, including evidence that 
                                                          
6 Id. at 591–92. 
7 Id. (interpreting the contours of MICH. R. EVID. 803A). For Rule 803A 
in its entirety, see infra Part II. 
8 See infra Part II. 
9 See Lynne E. Radke, Note, Michigan’s New Hearsay Exception: The 
“Reinstatement” of the Common Law Tender Years Rule, 70 U. DET. MERCY 
L. REV. 377, 405–06 (1993). 
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children rarely disclose sexual abuse, lack of existing physical 
evidence and witnesses, and the court’s interest in weeding out 
false accusations. Part II discusses the judicial and legislative 
responses to the problems faced by the prosecution, including 
the adoption of MRE 803A and its application by the Michigan 
courts. Part III of this Note discusses the Gursky case, including 
the facts and the analysis of the statements at issue by both the 
Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court. 
Part IV argues that the ultimate holding in Gursky essentially 
eliminated MRE 803A and that the decision will make it more 
difficult to prosecute child sexual abuse cases in Michigan. Part 
V explains how a totality of the circumstances approach, used 
by the Michigan Court of Appeals in the Gursky case and 
various other states, is a more appropriate test that weighs the 
state’s interests without hindering prosecutorial efforts. 
I. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD 
SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 
The victim in Gursky is among many children in the United 
States who fall victim to sexual abuse. Child sexual abuse is a 
growing epidemic in the United States and given its prevalence, 
the Supreme Court has recognized the need to protect the 
nation’s children from sexual abuse as a compelling interest.10 
Unfortunately, prosecutors face many obstacles in their attempts 
to prosecute dangerous sexual predators.11 The underreporting of 
cases, the fact that most children do not disclose sexual abuse on 
their own accord, the lack of physical evidence or witnesses in 
these cases, and the court’s need to identify false accusations, all 
serve as impediments for the prosecution and hinder their efforts 
to protect child victims from their abusers.12 
Although it is clear that incidents of child sexual abuse are 
                                                          
10 See Lynn McLain, Children Are Losing Maryland’s “Tender Years” 
War, 27 U. BALT. L. REV. 21, 25–26 (1997) (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 
U.S. 103, 109 (1990)). 
11 See infra Part I for a discussion of the problems faced by prosecutors. 
12 See infra Part I. 
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widespread, the statistics are inconsistent and often inaccurate.13 
One study found that such abuse has been reported up to 80,000 
times a year.14 Another report indicates that in 1993 alone, there 
were over 200,000 incidents of child sexual abuse.15 Some 
researchers estimate that in the United States, one out of every 
six boys, and one out of every four girls, is sexually abused.16 
One study estimated that in 2008, 772,000 children were victims 
of abuse or neglect and around nine percent of those were 
victims of sexual abuse.17 
While these numbers are alarming, the reason for the 
disparities among them is even more alarming. Due to the 
underreporting of child sexual abuse, these statistics fail to 
accurately reflect the actual number of instances of child sexual 
abuse.18 Underreporting is mostly a result of the fact that most 
                                                          
13 Tara Ney, Assessing Allegations in Child Sexual Abuse: An Overview, 
in TRUE AND FALSE ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: ASSESSMENT 
AND CASE MANAGEMENT 3, 6 (Tara Ney ed., 1995). 
14 AM. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY, FACTS FOR 
FAMILIES: CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (2008) [hereinafter FACTS FOR FAMILIES], 
available at http://www.aacap.org/galleries/FactsForFamilies/09_child_sexual 
_abuse.pdf. 
15 KIMBERLY A. MCCABE, CHILD ABUSE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 33 (David A. Schultz & Christina DeJong eds., 2003) (citing 
ANDREA J. SEDLAK & DIANE D. BROADHURST, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE THIRD NATIONAL INCIDENCE 
STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 4 (1996), available at http://www. 
fact.on.ca/Info/vac/nis3.pdf). 
16 Child Sexual Abuse, NAT’L CTR. FOR PTSD, http://www.ptsd. 
va.gov/public/pages/child-sexual-abuse.asp (last updated Oct. 7, 2011). 
17 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 
2008 xiii (2008), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/ 
cm08/cm08.pdf. 
18 See FACTS FOR FAMILIES, supra note 14; MCCABE, supra note 15, at 
33; see also SARAH H. RAMSEY & DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, CHILDREN AND THE 
LAW 133 (2003); HOLLIDA WAKEFIELD & RALPH UNDERWAGER, 
ACCUSATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 255 (1988) (“At present, there is not 
enough solid data to claim that the frequency of child sexual abuse in the true 
state of nature is known.”). “Because sexual abuse is usually a hidden 
offense, there are no statistics on how many cases occur each year. Statistics 
cover only the cases that are disclosed to child protection agencies or to law 
enforcement.” David Finkelhor, Current Information on the Scope and 
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sexually abused children never disclose the abuse.19 In fact, 
because of such lack of disclosure, in order to collect more 
accurate data concerning the prevalence of child sexual abuse, 
retrospective studies are often conducted where adults are asked 
about their childhood experiences.20 One retrospective study 
indicates that only 33.3% of adults who were sexually abused as 
a child ever disclosed the abuse to anyone during their 
childhood.21 In another retrospective study conducted on a 
sample of adults who had disclosed the abuse when they were 
children, over 50% of the adults stated that when they disclosed 
the abuse in their youth, they were not believed. 22 
There are many reasons why children do not disclose sexual 
abuse. Often an abused child fears the offender, blames herself23 
for the sexual abuse, or experiences negative emotions like 
embarrassment, shame, and anger.24 In many cases, child 
                                                          
Nature of Child Sexual Abuse, FUTURE CHILD., Summer/Fall 1994, at 31, 32; 
see also Kamala London et al., Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse: What Does 
the Research Tell Us About the Ways that Children Tell?, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 194, 194 (2005); McLain, supra note 10, at 28. 
19 MARK A. WINTON & BARBARA A. MARA, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 
48 (2001); London et al., supra note 18, at 194. 
20 However, either because victims will continue to repress their 
memories of sexual abuse into their adulthood or remain fearful or hesitant 
towards disclosure, these retroactive studies still result in an underestimation 
of the actual rate of child sexual abuse. WAKEFIELD & UNDERWAGER, supra 
note 18, at 258–59. See supra Part I for a more in depth discussion about the 
underreporting of, and inaccuracy in, statistics concerning the prevalence of 
child sexual abuse. 
21 London et al., supra note 18, at 198–201. London analyzed ten 
retrospective studies and concluded that “only one third of adults who 
suffered CSA revealed the abuse to anyone during childhood.” Id. at 201. 
22 Ney, supra note 13, at 6 (citing Ralph Brown et al., Preliminary 
Findings of the Long-Term Effects of Childhood Abuse: A Study of Survivors 
(1994) (unpublished manuscript)). 
23 Both boys and girls are victims of child sexual abuse. See London et 
al., supra note 18, at 204–06, for a discussion on the differences in the rate 
of disclosure between boys and girls. 
24 Child Sexual Abuse, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, 
http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&Document
ID=32315 (last visited Nov. 5, 2011); see also RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra 
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abusers threaten or manipulate their victims, often using 
aggressive tactics.25 Often the abusers warn of the potential 
consequences if the child should divulge the sexual abuse26 and 
in many instances, abusers tell their victims to keep the events a 
secret.27 Some abusers use physical force, which can result in a 
child not disclosing the sexual abuse in fear of retaliation.28 
Aside from fear, children are also reluctant to disclose abuse 
due to feelings of self-doubt and helplessness.29 Child victims of 
sexual abuse usually develop low self-esteem and can be 
mistrusting of adults, making disclosure to someone capable of 
stopping or reporting the abuse even more unlikely.30 
Michigan courts have recognized that a child victim may 
never reveal such abuse outright. In a 1930 case, People v. 
Baker, for example, the court noted that a child’s disclosure of 
sexual abuse may be delayed because of fear or other similar 
circumstances.31 In Baker, where the victim’s father told her not 
to disclose what had happened, the court acknowledged that 
“complaining of [her own father’s acts] would not occur to her” 
and the child’s “telling of the affair would more naturally arise 
as the relation of an unusual occurrence and might be delayed 
until something arose to suggest it.”32 After Baker, Michigan 
courts continually recognized that sexually abused children often 
                                                          
note 18, at 133; WAKEFIELD & UNDERWAGER, supra note 18, at 258 (“The 
secrecy, shame, and stigma which has surrounded victims and abusers may 
lead some to hide child sexual abuse.”); WINTON & MARA, supra note 19, at 
48. 
25 Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 24. 
26 FACTS FOR FAMILIES, supra note 14. 
27 See, e.g., People v. Whipple, No. 288591, 2010 WL 395747, at *2 
(Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2010). 
28 Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 24. 
29 See London et al., supra note 18, at 195 (citing Roland Summit, The 
Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 
177–93 (1983)). 
30 See FACTS FOR FAMILIES, supra note 14. 
31 People v. Baker, 232 N.W. 381, 383 (Mich. 1930). 
32 Id. Thus, the court in Baker held that a child’s statements to her 
housekeeper were admissible into evidence and the conviction of the victim’s 
father was affirmed. Id. 
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feel threatened and are fearful of disclosing the incidents of 
sexual abuse.33 Further, the courts acknowledged that sexual 
crimes against children are often underreported because of 
“various lamentable factors, including, but not limited to, the 
victim being related to the offender, the victim’s age, or the 
victim’s feelings of fear, embarrassment, or shame.”34   
Another reason for lack of disclosure is that in most cases of 
child sexual abuse the victims know their abusers.35 In these 
cases the child is often trapped between his or her love or 
loyalty for the abuser and the realization that the abuse is 
wrong.36 In cases where the abuser is the victim’s family 
member, the child often fears that by disclosing the abuse, he or 
she will break up the family or incur the shame of other family 
members.37 Additionally, in sexual abuse cases where a family 
member is the abuser, the families are characteristically 
“secretive in nearly all of their family activities, overly 
possessive of their children, and operate in an environment 
where the abused child and his or her abuser are often alone 
with each other.”38 
An additional impediment to a child reporting abuse is that, 
because of the child’s immaturity, “a young child may not 
know, or may know only on some intuitive level, that what is 
                                                          
33 See, e.g., People v. Hammons, 534 N.W.2d 183, 185 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1995) (holding the child’s delay in relating the events of sexual abuse 
was excusable “because of the nine-year-old complainant’s fear of reprisal 
against her father, the defendant”); People v. Foreman, 410 N.W.2d 289, 
293 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987), vacated, 432 N.W.2d 172 (Mich. 1988). 
34 People v. Cooper, 559 N.W.2d 90, 92–93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) 
(citing Donald Dripps et al., Special Issue on Women and the Law Panel 
Discussion: Men, Women and Rape, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 134–37 
(1994)). 
35 RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra note 18, at 133. Less than one-half of the 
cases of child sexual abuse are extrafamilial. MCCABE, supra note 15, at 38; 
Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 24. 
36 FACTS FOR FAMILIES, supra note 14. 
37 Id. 
38 MCCABE, supra note 15, at 35 (citing SUZANNE SGROI, HANDBOOK OF 
CLINICAL INTERVENTION IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (1982)). 
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happening is wrong and uncomfortable.”39 Further, children who 
are sexually abused may not be capable of expressing their 
experiences because of their lack of knowledge or 
understanding.40 Even children with a better understanding may 
be uncomfortable disclosing the details of the abuse because of 
the discomfort they feel towards sexual topics at such a young 
age.41 
In fact, many psychiatrists are suspicious if a child readily 
discloses abuse because of the difficulties children typically face 
in reporting abuse, as well as the statistical evidence supporting 
lack of disclosure.42 One study suggests that, “only those 
children who initially deny abuse, then make a sexual abuse 
allegation, then recant it, and later re-disclose, should be 
considered reliable cases of sexual abuse.”43 One expert 
psychiatrist testified that had she “heard about lengthy 
disclosures with a specific beginning, middle, and end to the 
story [she] would have been less impressed since that type of 
recounting is not likely with sexually abused children.”44 
A child typically discloses the sexual abuse when another 
adult, aside from the abuser, creates a safe environment for the 
child in which he or she feels comfortable enough to talk about 
the abuse.45 Children are thus more likely to disclose the sexual 
abuse “when talking to someone who appears to ‘already know’ 
and is not judgmental, critical or threatening.”46 As a result, 
when children disclose their sexual abuse, they usually do not 
introduce the subject of sexual abuse of their own accord.47 
                                                          
39 McLain, supra note 10, at 28. 
40 See MCCABE, supra note 15, at 34. 
41 See, e.g., People v. Whipple, No. 288591, 2010 WL 395747, at *2 
(Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2010) (citing People v. Hammons, 534 N.W.2d 
183, 185 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)). 
42 London et al., supra note 18, at 196. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. (quoting Lillie v. Newcastle City Council, [2002] EWHC (QB) 
1600). 
45 See FACTS FOR FAMILIES, supra note 14. 
46 Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 24. 
47 See WINTON & MARA, supra note 19, at 48; London et al., supra note 
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Without child victims alerting adults to the abuse, 
prosecutors must rely on the availability of other evidence or 
indicators in order to prosecute such crimes. Unfortunately, the 
lack of physical evidence48 in child sexual abuse cases presents 
prosecutors with an additional hurdle that makes such offenses 
difficult to discover, investigate, and prosecute.49 In most cases, 
there are no physical indicators of sexual abuse.50 In fact, “most 
perpetrators of child sexual abuse do not leave evidence in terms 
of sperm, blood, or tears in the child’s genital area because, in 
most cases of child sexual assault, vaginal or anal penetration 
does not occur.”51 Further, a child usually displays “no obvious 
external signs” of sexual abuse, making discovery very 
difficult.52 Physical signs may be detected by a physician53 but 
such detection is dependent on the child disclosing the abuse 
soon after the incident.54 In addition, there are no standard 
psychological symptoms a child displays that indicate a child has 
been sexually abused.55 Without the availability of physical 
evidence, a child’s statements generally constitute the central 
evidence in a child sexual abuse case. 56 
                                                          
18, at 195. 
48 See London et al., supra note 18, at 194 (explaining that medical and 
physical evidence is lacking in the vast majority of child sex abuse cases). 
49 People v. Cooper, 559 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (citing 
Donald Dripps et al., supra note 34). 
50 When a child does not report the abuse immediately, the physical 
evidence will be gone by the time sexual abuse is discovered, if it is ever 
discovered. MCCABE, supra note 15, at 42–43. 
51 MCCABE, supra note 15, at 43. 
52 FACTS FOR FAMILIES, supra note 14. 
53 Id. 
54 See supra Part I. 
55 London et al., supra note 18, at 194. 
56 Id. (citing J. Bays & D. Chadwick, Medical Diagnosis of the Sexually 
Abused Child, 17 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 91 (1993); A. Berenson et al., 
Appearance of the Hymen in Newborns, 87 PEDIATRICS 458 (1991)). 
Typically, there is a lack of evidence in child sexual abuse cases. See 
generally WINTON & MARA, supra note 19, at 51 (“[L]ess than 5 percent of 
sexual abuse cases involve physical evidence.” (citation omitted)). There are 
some clues to detecting child abuse that include abnormal behavior like 
“‘acting out,’ engaging in precocious sexual activity, or withdrawing from a 
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Aside from the dearth of physical evidence or indicators, 
there is also a lack of witnesses to the abuse.57 Both the 
Michigan courts and the U.S. Supreme Court have recognized 
that child abuse offenses are more difficult to prosecute because 
“they are generally committed under a shroud of secrecy, 
leaving the victim as the only significant witness to the 
offense.”58  
The possibility of false accusations poses an additional 
challenge. False accusations by children arise when a child 
fabricates stories of abuse, or an adult with an ulterior motive 
influences the child to make a statement that is untrue.59 Some 
studies estimate the rate of “false positives” to be around two to 
eight percent of all child abuse allegations.60 Such studies 
indicate that the frequency of false allegations tends to be higher 
in custody disputes.61 Often, parties in custody disputes hope to 
discredit each other in order to prove that one is better fit to 
care for the child than the other.62 In the context of these custody 
battles, some parents may accuse their spouse of sexually 
abusing their children.63 Consequently, if the court believes such 
                                                          
normal touch, such as a pat on the shoulder by a babysitter or a teacher[,]” 
but these are vague and often hard to identify. See McLain, supra note 10, at 
28 (citing JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 
CASES § 5.3 (3d ed. 1997)). 
57 London et al., supra note 18, at 194. 
58 People v. Cooper, 559 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (citing 
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987)). 
59 Ney, supra note 13, at 5; see also WINTON & MARA, supra note 19, at 
55–56. 
60 Ney, supra note 13, at 6 (citing Arthur H. Green, Factors 
Contributing to False Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse in Custody Disputes, 
in ASSESSING CHILD MALTREATMENT REPORTS: THE PROBLEM OF FALSE 
ALLEGATIONS 177–89 (M. Robin ed., 1991)). False positives are “cases 
where abuse is not occurring but is claimed to be [occurring].” Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Marion F. Ehrenberg & Michael F. Elterman, Evaluating Allegations 
of Sexual Abuse in the Context of Divorce, Child Custody, and Access 
Disputes, in TRUE AND FALSE ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: 
ASSESSMENT AND CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 13, at 209, 211. 
63 Id. (citing Elissa P. Benedek & Diane H. Schetky, Allegations of 
Sexual Abuse in Child Custody and Visitation Disputes, in EMERGING ISSUES 
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an accusation, the parent accused of the sexual abuse is likely to 
lose contact with the child while the other parent is likely to 
receive full custody.64 When these allegations are true, a grant of 
full custody to a non-abusive parent is clearly in the best interest 
of the child. However, a problem arises when one parent falsely 
reports an instance of sexual abuse that never occurred, or 
wrongfully influences the child to fabricate a story of sexual 
abuse in order to obtain full custody.65 Psychiatrists have found 
that young children can be improperly influenced by their 
parent, another close family friend, or professionals, like 
investigators or therapists.66 
False accusations do not just occur in custody cases where 
one parent accuses another parent. False accusations also arise 
against adults who take care of children, like teachers, camp 
counselors, or day care employees.67 Additionally, an adolescent 
motivated by anger or a desire for the attention that accompanies 
an accusation of sexual abuse can, on his or her own accord, 
fabricate an incidence of sexual abuse.68   
II. MRE 803A: THE LEGISLATURE’S RESPONSE TO THE 
DIFFICULTIES IN THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
CASES 
Faced with the difficulties of prosecuting sexual crimes 
against children, states crafted evidentiary exceptions particular 
to child sexual abuse cases in hopes of facilitating prosecutorial 
                                                          
IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 145–48 (Diane Schetky & Elissa Benedek 
eds., 1985). 
64 Id. 
65 See WAKEFIELD & UNDERWAGER, supra note 18, at 294–98. 
66 For a scientific research study on the suggestibility of children, see 
Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children: 
Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 33 (2000). 
These same studies indicate that absent “significant prompting,” children may 
hesitate to disclose incidents of sexual abuse. Id. at 34. 
67 WAKEFIELD & UNDERWAGER, supra note 18, at 299. 
68 Id. at 300. 
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efforts.69 Similarly, the Michigan judiciary and legislature 
recognized the need to protect children and implemented 
procedures and recording systems to aid the prosecution of these 
crimes.70 Although it was not until 1990 that the legislature 
adopted MRE 803A,71 a specific hearsay exception for child 
sexual abuse cases, the state acknowledged the concerns for the 
prosecution and recognized a similar exception as early as the 
mid-1880s.72 
Prior to the adoption of the Michigan Rules of Evidence in 
1978, the Michigan Supreme Court recognized a common law 
“tender years” exception to the hearsay rule in 1886.73 In 
applying the tender years exception, the court in People v. Baker 
held that “where the victim is of tender years, the testimony of 
the details of her complaint may be introduced in corroboration 
of her evidence, if her statement is shown to have been 
spontaneous and without indication of manufacture.”74 However, 
when the MRE was adopted in 1978, the legislature failed to 
include a tender years exception.75 Given its absence in the rules, 
the Michigan Supreme Court abolished the exception altogether 
in People v. Kreiner in 1982.76 
In the years following the Kreiner decision, Michigan courts 
urged a reconsideration of the MRE because of the inherent 
difficulty of prosecuting child sexual abuse cases.77 Ultimately, 
                                                          
69 For a discussion on New Jersey’s, Delaware’s, and Mississippi’s rules, 
see infra Part V. 
70 People v. Cooper, 559 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996). 
 71 See MICH. R. EVID. 803A. 
72 People v. Gage, 28 N.W. 835, 836 (Mich. 1886); see also JAMES K. 
ROBINSON ET AL., MICHIGAN COURT RULES PRACTICE: EVIDENCE § 803A.1 
(3d ed. 2009). 
73 Gage, 28 N.W. at 836; see also People v. Baker, 232 N.W. 381 
(Mich. 1930); Radke, supra note 9, at 382–83. 
74 Baker, 232 N.W. at 383. 
75 Radke, supra note 9, at 383. 
76 People v. Kreiner, 329 N.W.2d 716, 717 (Mich. 1982). 
77 See, e.g., People v. Lee, 442 N.W.2d 662, 665 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1989) (Weaver, J., dissenting); People v. Verburg, 430 N.W.2d 775, 777 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that following Kreiner, courts are under 
increasing pressure to expand the excited utterance exception to replace the 
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in 1990, the legislature adopted MRE 803A and reinstated the 
exception.78 MRE 803A reads: 
A statement describing an incident that included a sexual 
act performed with or on the declarant by the defendant 
or an accomplice is admissible to the extent that it 
corroborates testimony given by the declarant during the 
same proceeding, provided: 
1) the declarant was under the age of ten when the 
statement was made; 
2) the statement is shown to have been spontaneous and 
without indication of manufacture; 
3) either the declarant made the statement immediately 
after the incident or any delay is excusable as having 
been caused by fear or other equally effective 
circumstance; and 
4) the statement is introduced through the testimony of 
someone other than the declarant. 
 If the declarant made more than one corroborative 
statement about the incident, only the first is admissible 
under this rule. 
 A statement may not be admitted under this rule unless 
the proponent of the statement makes known to the 
adverse party the intent to offer the statement, and the 
particulars of the statement, sufficiently in advance of the 
trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair 
opportunity to meet the statement. 
 This rule applies in criminal and delinquency 
proceedings only.79 
The purpose of the exception is to allow an adult to 
corroborate out-of-court statements made by a child in order to 
provide additional credibility to the child’s testimony in court.80 
                                                          
tender years doctrine); see also Radke, supra note 9, at 387–88 (citing People 
v. Straight, 424 N.W.2d 257 (Mich. 1988)). 
78  See MICH. R. EVID. 803A. 
79 MICH. R. EVID. 803A. 
80 ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 72. 
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The rule thus acknowledges that a young child, unfamiliar with 
the courtroom or court proceedings, may feel more tense or 
uncomfortable than he or she would outside the courthouse, and 
may, as a result, testify less credibly and truthfully than he or 
she would outside the courthouse environment.81 As a child may 
also have difficulty articulating earlier events, the rule permits 
an adult, better able to remember and articulate the earlier 
event, to testify and corroborate the child victim’s statements.82   
In adopting MRE 803A, the legislature balanced two 
competing interests. The first was the need to protect children, 
particularly sexually abused children. The state recognized that 
to protect child victims of sexual abuse, the exception was 
necessary to “remedy the unusual difficulties encountered in 
prosecuting crimes in which the only witness is a young, fearful, 
and uncommunicative child.”83 Despite the existence of two 
similar hearsay exceptions, the “medical treatment exception” 
recognized in MRE 803(4), and the “excited utterance 
exception” recognized in MRE 803(2),84 the legislature opted to 
create an additional exception with modifications specifically for 
child sexual abuse cases.85 Most importantly, MRE 803A 
dispensed of any contemporaneity requirement in the rule.86 
Unlike MRE 803(2),87 which requires that a statement admitted 
under the “excited utterance exception” be made 
contemporaneously with the event or condition, MRE 803A 
contains no such requirement.88 In fact, MRE 803A specifically 
                                                          
81 Id. 
82 See McLain, supra note 10, at 25. 
83 Radke, supra note 9, at 405 (quoting Note, The Testimony of Child 
Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 806, 817 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 84 MICH. R. EVID. 803(2), (4). For an explanation of these two 
exceptions, see Radke, supra note 9, at 388–93. 
85 ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 72.  
86 See MICH. R. EVID. 803A; Radke, supra note 9, at 406. 
87 The excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule permits into 
evidence “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while 
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 
condition.” MICH. R. EVID. 803(2).  
88 Id. at 803A. 
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excuses any delay between the sexual act and the statement, 
acknowledging that such delay may be “caused by fear or other 
equally effective circumstance.”89 Further, MRE 803A is 
broader than MRE 803(4) in that the statement need not be made 
for the purpose of medical treatment.90 In addition, unlike the 
other two exceptions, the MRE 803A exception applies solely to 
child sexual abuse cases.91  
In codifying MRE 803A, the legislature was also concerned 
with the rights of the accused. Accordingly, the text of the 
hearsay exception provides several safeguards for defendants in 
child sexual abuse cases. MRE 803A guarantees “the defendant 
his constitutional right to confront witnesses testifying against 
him” by only admitting hearsay to corroborate a child’s in-court 
testimony.92 Additionally, the exception requires that the 
statement be both “spontaneous” and “without indication of 
manufacture” in order to protect the accused from false 
allegations.93 The defendant is further protected because the 
prosecution must give the defendant notice of its intent to use 
MRE 803A well in advance of trial so that the defendant has 
ample time to respond.94 The text of MRE 803A clearly 
indicates the intent of the legislature to protect both parties in its 
creation of an exception tailored specifically to child sexual 
abuse cases.95 
III. PEOPLE V. GURSKY: THE COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF WHAT 
CONSTITUTES A “SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT” 
On appeal in the Gursky case in 2010, the Michigan 
Supreme Court only needed to decide whether the child victim’s 
statements made to an adult in 2006 satisfied the spontaneity 
                                                          
89 Id. at 803A(3). 
90 Id. at 803(4), 803A. 
91 Id. at 803(2), (4), 803A. 
92 Radke, supra note 9, at 405. 
93 See MICH. R. EVID. 803A(2). 
94 Id. at 803A. 
95 For a rationale of MICH. R. EVID. 803A, see ROBINSON ET AL., supra 
note 72; see also Radke, supra note 9, at 405. 
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requirement of MRE 803A in order for the court to admit the 
statements.96 The court interpreted one particular requirement of 
MRE 803A—that “the statement is shown to have been 
spontaneous and without indication of manufacture.”97 
Stacy Morgan, an adult family friend of both the child victim 
and her mother, gave the testimony at trial.98 Morgan testified to 
corroborate statements the young child had made when she first 
disclosed the defendant’s sexual abuse to Morgan.99 The child’s 
disclosure to Morgan of the defendant’s sexual abuse came only 
after Morgan asked the child victim “if anyone had been 
touching her.”100 The victim responded that the defendant had 
touched her and then “willingly gave details that exceeded the 
scope of Morgan’s inquiry” and volunteered specific details 
regarding how, where, and when the defendant sexually abused 
her.101  
After the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the 
defendant’s conviction, the defendant appealed, arguing that the 
statements made by the victim to Morgan were inadmissible 
because they were not spontaneous, as required by MRE 
803A.102 In reaching its decision that the statements were not 
spontaneous, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected a totality of 
the circumstances approach, and instead focused only on one 
factor to reject the spontaneity– that the adult had introduced the 
subject of sexual abuse.103 The court held that, because Morgan 
had broached the subject of sexual abuse when she asked the 
child victim “if anyone had been touching her,”104 the court 
                                                          
96 Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Mich. 2010). 
97 Id. at 590–91 (quoting MICH. R. EVID. 803A). 
98 People v. Gursky (Gursky I), No. 274945, 2008 WL 2780282, at *1–2 
(Mich. Ct. App. July 17, 2008), vacated, aff’d on other grounds, 786 
N.W.2d 579. 
99 Id. at *2. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Mich. 2010). 
103 Id. at 593 (rejecting the Court of Appeals’ approach, which focuses 
on a variety of indicia of reliability). 
104 Gursky I, 2008 WL 2780282, at *2. 
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could not consider any of the subsequent statements made by the 
child as spontaneous.105 
In support of its decision to constrain the meaning of 
spontaneous statements, the court referred to a New Jersey case, 
State v. D.G.106 In State v. D.G., the child made statements in a 
stressful situation where the child had been interrogated by her 
aunt, who had been screaming at the child.107 In addition, the 
child had initially lied and made several inconsistent 
statements.108 Reiterating the holding of the D.G. case, the 
Gursky court concluded that a child’s statements made during an 
interrogation by an adult are not spontaneous.109 
While the court correctly read the holding of the D.G. 
case,110 the court incorrectly applied that holding to the facts in 
Gursky. The court failed to differentiate between two situations: 
when a child is interrogated and when an adult asks a child a 
question. In Gursky, none of the elements that were present in 
the D.G. case existed when the victim made the statement.111 
There was no indication of any screaming or interrogation by 
Morgan, and no evidence suggested that the child lied.112 
Further, the child volunteered specific and detailed information 
about the sexual abuse in her statements, evidencing the 
requisite spontaneous elements.113  
In comparing the two cases and in using the D.G. case as 
                                                          
105 Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d at 593. 
106 Id. at 590 (citing State v. D.G., 732 A.2d 588, 592–95, (N.J. 1999)). 
107 D.G., 732 A.2d at 595.   
108 Id.   
109 Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d at 590 (citing D.G., 723 A.2d at 595).  
110 D.G., 723 A.2d at 595. “The situation under which Michelle 
disclosed the sexual abuse was very stressful. Michelle did not spontaneously 
divulge information concerning the assault to Aunt Sandy, but rather Aunt 
Sandy interrogated her after finding her performing questionable acts while at 
play.” Id. 
111 Compare D.G., 723 A.2d at 595, with Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d at 592, 
and Gursky I, No. 274945, 2008 WL 2780282, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. July 
17, 2008), vacated, aff’d on other grounds, 786 N.W.2d 579. 
112 See Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d at 592; Gursky I, 2008 WL 2780282, at 
*2. 
113 Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d at 592; Gursky I, 2008 WL 2780282, at *2. 
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support for its holding, the court essentially grouped all cases 
where a child does not broach the subject of sexual abuse into 
one category of non-spontaneous statements, despite the fact that 
some statements possess more spontaneity than others. Clearly a 
statement made by a child under the stress and pressure of the 
circumstances presented in the D.G. case are less spontaneous 
and present a higher risk of manufacture than the statement 
made by Gursky’s victim. Further, despite citing to the D.G. 
case, the court neglected to recognize that in looking to the 
various factors—i.e. that the child had lied, the adult had 
screamed, that the child had been interrogated—the New Jersey 
court was using a totality of the circumstances approach to reach 
its conclusion, and was not establishing a general rule regarding 
spontaneity.114 
Although the Gursky court determined that the statements 
themselves were inadmissible, the court upheld the defendant’s 
convictions of four counts of first-degree criminal sexual 
conduct.115 The court affirmed the conviction based on the large 
quantity of evidence the prosecution presented at trial, which is 
not typical in a child sexual abuse case.116 The child victim, 
three corroborating witnesses, and a nurse, all testified for the 
prosecution.117 In fact, the prosecution did not substantially rely 
on the statements at issue in proving the defendant’s guilt at 
trial.118 
IV. THE ELIMINATION OF MRE 803A AND THE INCREASED 
DIFFICULTY FOR THE PROSECUTION 
While the court’s determination that the prosecution could 
not admit the hearsay testimony under MRE 803A did not affect 
the holding in the specific case, the narrowing effect of the 
                                                          
114 See D.G., 723 A.2d at 595. For a discussion of New Jersey’s hearsay 
exception, see infra Part V. 
115 Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d at 582. 
116 Id.; Gursky I, 2008 WL 2780282, at *1; see supra Part I (discussing 
the rarity of physical evidence in child sexual abuse cases). 
117 Gursky I, 2008 WL 2780282, at *1. 
118 Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d at 582. 
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court’s decision on the application of the exception will 
negatively impact future prosecutions of child sexual abuse in 
the state of Michigan. The decision substantially restricts the 
statements that will constitute as “spontaneous” in such a way so 
as to basically eliminate the exception altogether. 
According to the holding, for a child’s statement to qualify 
as a “spontaneous statement” and thus be admissible under MRE 
803A, the child must have broached the subject of sexual 
abuse.119 In reaching its decision, the court implied that it was 
not eliminating the rule altogether. Rather, the court stated that 
while “the mere fact [that] questioning occurred is not 
incompatible with a ruling that the child produced a spontaneous 
statement . . . . for such statements to be admissible, the child 
must broach the subject of sexual abuse . . .”120 The court, in an 
attempt to limit its holding, continued, “we do not hold that any 
questioning by an adult automatically renders a statement 
‘nonspontaneous’ and thus inadmissible under MRE 803A.”121 
However, as this section explores, the court’s qualification still 
renders the majority of statements made by children disclosing 
sexual abuse inadmissible. 
While the ruling differentiates statements made in response 
to an adult broaching the subject of sexual abuse and statements 
made in response to any questioning by an adult,122 the unique 
nature of child sexual abuse and its psychological implications123 
make the differentiation immaterial. The scientific studies clearly 
indicate that children rarely disclose sexual abuse and that when 
they do, it is not the child who broaches the subject of sexual 
abuse.124 Thus, a rule that only admits a child’s statements when 
the child broaches the subject of sexual abuse makes most 
statements inadmissible. The result is that the holding permits 
admissibility in the minority of cases—where children on their 
                                                          
119 Id. at 591. 
120 Id.  
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 See supra Part I, for a discussion concerning the lack of disclosure in 
child sexual abuse cases. 
124 See supra Part I. 
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own accord disclose sexual abuse—but blocks admissibility in 
the majority of cases—where such disclosure is only made when 
the child feels comfortable with the adult and the adult asks 
more focused questions.125  
This restrictive interpretation of MRE 803A limits the rule to 
a much narrower hearsay exception that is similar to the rule in 
Maryland.126 Maryland currently only permits out-of-court 
statements made by a child victim to a physician, psychologist, 
nurse, social worker, or other school official (i.e. a principal, 
teacher, or counselor).127 Maryland’s statute is one of the most 
restrictive in regards to hearsay exceptions in child sexual abuse 
cases.128 As a result of the restrictive statute, cases exist where 
the court acquits an alleged sexual abuser for trivial reasons, for 
example, that the child’s statement was made to a police officer, 
rather than to an individual listed under the statute.129 The 
Maryland statute is a per se rule, in that if the statement is not 
made to a qualified individual under the statute, the statement 
cannot even be reviewed by the judge for reliability.130 The 
highly restrictive rule fails to appropriately balance the interests 
of the child against the interests of the accused.131 Such a rule 
does not provide that judges and jurors analyze all of the 
evidence and determine the credibility of the statements.132 
Instead of balancing, the rule primarily protects the alleged 
abusers, and undermines the interests of the child victims.133 
The consequences of the court’s near elimination of MRE 
803A, and its tendency towards a more restrictive approach 
similar to the Maryland rule, is that prosecutors will face an 
                                                          
125 See supra Part I. 
126 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-304 (West 2011). 
127 § 11-304. 
128 McLain, supra note 10, at 21–22. 
129 Id. at 23 (citing Jackie Powder, Judge’s Ban of Social Worker’s 
Testimony in Child Abuse Case Upsets Investigators, BALT. SUN, Aug. 9, 
1992, at 6B). 
130 McLain, supra note 10, at 23–24. 
131 See id. at 24. 
132 Id. at 24. 
133 See id. 
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even more difficult challenge in child sexual abuse cases, and 
child sex abusers could go free. Before Gursky, prosecutors 
already faced substantial challenges in combating child sexual 
abuse crimes because of the little, or inconclusive, medical or 
physical evidence available in most cases.134 This lack of 
evidence is a large factor in the low rate of prosecution of 
sexual abuse crimes in comparison to the prosecution of other 
violent crimes.135 Given the evidence that the actual incidence of 
child sexual abuse is much greater than the reported number, 
and given the low prosecution rate, it is clear that, even prior to 
Gursky, courts needed to facilitate the prosecution of child 
sexual abuse.136 
Since children’s statements usually represent the central 
evidence for the prosecution,137 and in most cases prosecutors 
rely on a child’s out-of-court statements to identify and 
prosecute the abuser,138 the holding significantly disadvantages 
the prosecution. If the prosecution is unable to use these 
statements, it possesses even less evidence against the alleged 
sexual abuser.139 By reducing the ability of the prosecution to 
introduce an adult’s testimony that corroborates the child’s 
testimony at trial, the Gursky court added another obstacle for 
the prosecution.140  
In codifying a specific hearsay exception for child sexual 
abuse cases, it is evident that the Michigan legislature realized 
the importance of the admissibility of these statements at trial.141 
                                                          
134 London et al., supra note 18, at 194 (citing Jan Bays & David 
Chadwick, Medical Diagnosis of the Sexually Abused Child, 17 CHILD ABUSE 
& NEGLECT 91 (1993); Abbey Berenson et al., Appearance of the Hymen in 
Newborns, 87 PEDIATRICS 458 (1991)). 
135 Finkelhor, supra note 18, at 31. 
136 See id. 
137 London et al., supra note 18, at 194–95. 
138 See McLain, supra note 10, at 29. 
139 Id. 
140 See supra Part II for a discussion of the corroboration requirement of 
MRE 803A. 
141 See supra Part II for a discussion on the reasons the Michigan 
legislature codified MRE 803A and the rule’s previous history as a common 
law exception to the hearsay rule known as the tender years exception. 
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A decision that undermines the legislative intent by restricting 
the use of the rule to a few very rare cases is unworkable. 
Rather, an approach that considers the unique nature of child 
sexual abuse cases and provides for the admissibility of a child’s 
statements when they are in fact spontaneous, given the 
circumstances under which they were made, is a more 
responsible alternative that will not result in a detriment to the 
prosecution and a danger to society. While limitations on the 
admissibility of out-of-court statements serve important interests, 
including assuring that false accusations are not admitted as 
evidence against the accused, there are less restrictive means to 
protect such interests that strike an appropriate balance. 
V. TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES: A MORE APPROPRIATE 
TEST FOR SPONTANEITY 
An ideal test for the admissibility of statements made by a 
child to an adult regarding sexual abuse needs to be cognizant of 
two societal interests—protecting the accused and protecting the 
victim. Courts must address two fears at different ends of the 
spectrum: the fear of a false accusation, and the fear that absent 
adult questioning, a child who has been sexually abused will 
never disclose the abuse.142 When the Gursky court decided that 
statements made by a child who does not broach the subject of 
sexual abuse are generally inadmissible,143 the court addressed 
the former concern, but failed to even remotely address the 
latter. These interests are instead more adequately protected by 
applying the totality of the circumstances test used by the 
Michigan Court of Appeals,144 and by various other states,145 to 
analyze the child’s statements and the questioning by the adult to 
determine the admissibility of the hearsay statements.  
The Michigan Court of Appeals applied the totality of the 
                                                          
142 See supra Part I. 
143 Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d 579, 591 (Mich. 2010). 
144 Gursky I, No. 274945, 2008 WL 2780282, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. 
July 17, 2008), vacated, aff’d on other grounds, 786 N.W.2d 579. 
145 Delaware, Mississippi, and New Jersey are a few states that apply a 
similar test. For a discussion of those tests, see infra pp. 123–25. 
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circumstances test in Gursky to determine the admissibility of 
the out-of-court statements.146 The court considered the following 
elements: the victim’s and the adult’s behavior during the 
questioning, what information the victim volunteered on her own 
accord, and whether the victim was prompted by the adult’s 
questioning.147 One important factor the court considered was 
that the victim had volunteered specific details and 
information.148 Based on the facts, the court held that “[t]aken as 
a whole, the victim’s statements were primarily spontaneous” 
and thus admissible.149 Instead of looking to one particular 
question to reject spontaneity—that the adult had broached the 
subject of sexual abuse150—as the Michigan Supreme Court did, 
the court looked to all the circumstances to determine whether 
the statements as a whole were spontaneous.151 The appellate 
court was not alone in applying this approach: New Jersey, 
Mississippi, and Delaware also use similar rules. 
New Jersey uses New Jersey Rule of Evidence 803(c)(27), 
which is similar to MRE 803A.152 The New Jersey rule is more 
lenient than MRE 803A, in that the rule permits the courts to 
analyze the totality of the circumstances153 in determining the 
trustworthiness of the statement.154 New Jersey, like other states, 
                                                          
146 Gursky I, 2008 WL 2780282, at *2. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Mich. 2010). 
151 Gursky I, 2008 WL 2780282, at *2. 
152 N.J. R. EVID. 803(c)(27). 
153 The New Jersey court reaffirmed this approach in State v. P.S., 997 
A.2d 163 (N.J. 2010). “We reiterate that the totality of circumstances 
standard is the appropriate benchmark for the admissibility of a tender-years 
statement under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27).” Id. at 182. 
154 See N.J. R. EVID. 803(c)(27).  
Statements by a child relating to a sexual offense. A statement by a 
child under the age of 12 relating to sexual misconduct committed 
with or against that child is admissible in a criminal, juvenile, or 
civil proceeding if (a) the proponent of the statement makes known 
to the adverse party his intention to offer the statement and the 
particulars of the statement at such time as to provide him with a fair 
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adopted the tender years exception to serve legitimate and 
significant law enforcement interests.155 For courts to admit out-
of-court statements in New Jersey, the statements must “possess 
‘sufficient indicia of reliability.’”156 In determining what factors 
the court should analyze to decide whether the statements were 
trustworthy and thus admissible, New Jersey looked to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Idaho v. Wright. There, the Court 
declined to implement a mechanical test and instead considered 
factors like “spontaneity, consistency of repetition, lack of 
motive to fabricate, the mental state of the declarant, use of 
terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, interrogation, 
and manipulation by adults.”157 In applying those factors in State 
v. D.G., the New Jersey court held that New Jersey Rule of 
Evidence 803(c)(27) “requires the court to find . . . that on the 
basis of the time, content and circumstances of the statement 
there is a probability that the statement is trustworthy.”158  
New Jersey and Michigan are not the only states to 
acknowledge the importance of the admissibility of such 
statements by adopting exceptions to the hearsay rule in child 
sexual abuse cases. Mississippi159 and Delaware160 have similar 
rules. Mississippi’s hearsay exception requires the court to find 
                                                          
opportunity to prepare to meet it; (b) the court finds, in a hearing 
conducted pursuant to Rule 104(a), that on the basis of the time, 
content and circumstances of the statement there is a probability that 
the statement is trustworthy; and (c) either (i) the child testifies at 
the proceeding, or (ii) the child is unavailable as a witness and there 
is offered admissible evidence corroborating the act of sexual abuse; 
provided that no child whose statement is to be offered in evidence 
pursuant to this rule shall be disqualified to be a witness in such 
proceeding by virtue of the requirements of Rule 601. 
Id. 
155 See State v. D.G., 723 A.2d 588, 593 (N.J. 1999) (quoting State v. 
D.R., 537 A.2d 667, 675 (N.J. 1988)). 
156 Id. at 593 (quoting D.R., 537 A.2d at 675). 
157 Id. at 594 (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821–22, 827 
(1990)). 
158 Id. at 596. 
159 MISS. R. EVID. 803(25). 
160 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3513 (West 2011). 
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“in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the 
time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide 
substantial indicia of reliability.”161 Mississippi courts have 
similarly cited factors from the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Idaho v. Wright to determine the reliability of the child’s 
statements.162 In Mississippi, the court need not make specific 
findings on each factor, but rather can consider all relevant 
factors to determine whether enough evidence of reliability and 
spontaneity exist for the court to deem the hearsay statement 
admissible.163 
Similarly, the Delaware rule requires a determination that the 
“statement is shown to possess particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”164 In reaching a decision, some of the factors 
the court should consider include, “[t]he child’s personal 
knowledge of the event,” “[t]he age and maturity of the child,” 
“[c]ertainty that the statement was made, including the 
credibility of the person testifying about the statement,” 
“whether the statement is suggestive due to improperly leading 
question,” and “whether the statement is spontaneous or directly 
responsive to questions . . . .”165 In applying the rule, the 
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the admission of a child’s 
out-of-court statements where the “[t]rial judge found there was 
no known motive for her to falsify her statement, her 
terminology was age appropriate, the statement was videotaped, 
the questions were not improperly leading, and defendant had 
the opportunity to commit the alleged act.”166 
Like the Michigan Court of Appeals in Gursky, the 
approaches in Delaware, Mississippi, and New Jersey focus on 
an analysis of the entire statement to determine its reliability, 
                                                          
161 MISS. R. EVID. 803(25)(a). 
162 Bridgeman v. State, 2009-KA-01389-COA (¶ 22), 58 So. 3d 1208, 
1213–14 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 
(1990)). 
163 Id. ¶ 23, 58 So. 3d at 1214. 
164 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3513(b)(2)(b) (West 2011).  
165 Id. § 3513(e)(1)–(3), (11), (12). 
166 Randall v. State, No. 44, 2006 WL 2434912, at *1 (Del. Aug. 21, 
2006). 
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and thus its admissibility. These states consider the environment 
in which the statement was made, and how it was made.167 More 
importantly, the states’ rules do not require that the child broach 
the subject of sexual abuse.168 By looking to all the 
circumstances in which a child made a statement to determine 
spontaneity and reliability, the admissibility tests in these states 
more adequately balance the interests of protecting the child and 
the accused. 
The Gursky court failed in balancing both of these interests and 
seemed more concerned with the rights of the accused than with the 
consequences of such a restrictive rule on the prosecution of child 
sexual abuse cases.169 This failure by the court is particularly 
worrisome given the evidence indicating the rarity of false 
accusations170 and that there is little if any indication of a prevalence 
of unwarranted convictions.171 A study in 1987 found that 8% of the 
allegations in a sample of child sexual abuse allegations were false, 
with 6% originating from adults and 2% originating from children.172 
Another study in 1989 found the percentage of false allegations in 
samples to be between 4.7% and 7.6%.173 These studies suggest that 
the rate of false allegations is under 8%, and that the rate of false 
allegations arising from children is even lower.174 
                                                          
167 Gursky II, 786 N.W.2d 579, 590–91 (Mich. 2010); Randall, 2006 
WL 2434912, at *1; State v. D.G., 723 A.2d 588, 593 (N.J. 1999); 
Bridgeman, ¶¶ 22-24, 58 So. 3d at 1213–14. 
168 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3513(e); MISS. R. EVID. 803(25); N.J. R. 
EVID. 803(c)(27). 
169 See supra Part IV. 
170 John C. Yuille et al., The Nature of Allegations of Child Sexual 
Abuse, in TRUE AND FALSE ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: 
ASSESSMENT AND CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 13, at 21, 23. 
171 McLain, supra note 10, at 68–71 (citing Finkelhor, supra note 18, at 
43, 45). 
172 Yuille et al., supra note 170, at 23 (citing David P.H. Jones & J. 
Melbourne McGraw, Reliable and Fictitious Accounts of Sexual Abuse to 
Children, 2 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 27, 27–45 (1987)). 
173 Id. (citing Mark D. Everson & Barbara W. Boat, False Allegations of 
Sexual Abuse By Children and Adolescents, 28 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & 
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 230, 230–35 (1989)). 
174 Id. at 23–24. 
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The fear of false accusations is further undermined by the 
MRE 803A protections for the accused. Most significantly, 
MRE 803A(2) requires the statement be “spontaneous and 
without indication of manufacture,” which is an entirely separate 
factor the court can consider for admissibility.175 Further, MRE 
803A only allows a hearsay statement to be introduced as 
evidence “to the extent that it corroborates testimony given by 
the declarant during the same proceeding.”176 Thus, the rule 
recognizes the accused’s constitutional right of due process in 
requiring that the accused may confront all witnesses testifying 
against him or her.177 The exception is even further limited in 
that it only permits testimony regarding the first corroborative 
statement made by the child, despite the fact that there may have 
been multiple statements.178 
Notwithstanding the rarity of false accusations and the fact 
that MRE 803A provides protections for the accused, the totality 
of the circumstances test still adequately protects against any 
false accusations. The test requires an analysis of all of the 
circumstances surrounding the statement to determine the 
trustworthiness of the statement.179 An application of the test 
identifies spontaneity based on the circumstances in which the 
                                                          
175 MICH. R. EVID. 803A(2) (emphasis added). 
176 MICH. R. EVID. 803A. 
177 Radke, supra note 9, at 405. The rule balances the rights of the 
accused and the potential that testifying will cause harm to the child. See 
Lorne D. Bertrand et al., The Child Witness in Sexual Abuse Cases: 
Professional and Ethical Considerations, in TRUE AND FALSE ALLEGATIONS 
OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: ASSESSMENT AND CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 
13, at 319, 320–21 (discussing evidence that testifying might cause emotional 
and psychological harm to children). The child may be “revictimized” by the 
experience when he or she is required to provide details relating to the abuse 
and relive the experience. Id. at 320. Testifying in court is a traumatic 
experience for children who have already dealt with the pain of the actual 
sexual abuse itself, but the right of the accused to face his or her accuser is 
an important one. Id. at 320–21. 
178 MICH. R. EVID. 803A. 
179 See Gursky I, No. 274945, 2008 WL 2780282, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. 
July 17, 2008), vacated, aff’d on other grounds, 786 N.W.2d 579; see also 
supra pp. 122–25. 
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questioning occurred, what questions were asked, and what the 
child’s responses were to the questions. In this analysis, an 
accused will be adequately protected against false accusations 
because the circumstances surrounding the statements and the 
statements themselves would reveal fabrication or inconsistent 
testimony. The circumstances and any inconsistencies would 
then be considered in the determination of the admissibility of 
the statements under MRE 803A.  
Aside from protecting the accused, the totality of the 
circumstances test more adequately protects the child victims 
than the restrictive rule announced in Gursky. If most children 
will not disclose the existence of sexual abuse,180 it is necessary 
for any test determining spontaneity to permit an adult to broach 
the subject of sexual abuse in order to create a workable 
exception. A totality of the circumstances test is more 
appropriate because it allows for an adult to broach the subject 
of sexual abuse so long as the child’s statements are still 
spontaneous. 
Research by some psychologists suggests that they would 
support a totality of the circumstances test. Several psychologists 
have argued that to evaluate the truth of an allegation of child 
sexual abuse, objectivity is critical and many factors should be 
taken into account.181 Tara Ney, a registered psychologist in 
Canada who focuses on treating children and adults who have 
suffered from trauma, suggests that to assess the veracity of an 
allegation, the following should be considered and analyzed: the 
parties involved, the specifics concerning the circumstances and 
the context in which the child made the accusations, including 
what the child said, and specifically, what circumstances existed 
when the child made the initial statement.182 These findings 
support the totality of the circumstances approach because they 
favor a broad assessment of the conditions in which the 
statement was made. 
Additionally, studies indicate that there may actually be 
                                                          
180 See supra Part I. 
181 Ney, supra note 13, at 11–12.  
182 Id. 
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benefits of directed questioning, as opposed to waiting for a 
child’s free recall.183 Benefits of this type of questioning include 
that children may give longer responses and include more 
important details.184 Because directed and focused questioning is 
much more effective in obtaining disclosure of sexual abuse than 
waiting for a child to recall the incident, the court should not 
discourage such questioning.185 Still, statements made in response 
to directed and focused questioning should only be admissible if, 
after analyzing the totality of the circumstances, the statements 
on a whole were spontaneous. 
Michigan has already applied a totality of the circumstances 
test for the admissibility of statements using other similar 
hearsay exceptions. For example, in a case concerning the 
admissibility of a child’s statements made to a physician, the 
court held that to determine the trustworthiness of the child’s 
statement, relevant factors included: the child’s age and 
maturity, how the statements were elicited, how the statements 
were phrased, the use of unexpected terminology given the 
child’s age, who initiated the questioning, the relationship of the 
child to the adult, and whether or not there was a motive to 
fabricate.186 Courts should extend this test to the application of 
MRE 803A in order to avoid a complete elimination of the 
hearsay exception. 
CONCLUSION 
Statutory history reveals that the Michigan legislature 
introduced a specific hearsay exception solely for child sexual 
abuse cases, because it felt strongly that the courts needed such 
an exception.187 MRE 803A permits an adult, after a sexually 
                                                          
183 Ceci & Friedman, supra note 66, at 45–46 (citing ALFRED BINET, LA 
SUGGESTIBILITÉ 255–56, 294 (1900)). 
184 Id. at 45. 
185 Id. at 46. 
186 People v. Correa, No. 290271, 2010 WL 1979297, at *3 (Mich. Ct. 
App. May 18, 2010) (citing People v. Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d 621, 627 
(Mich. 1992)). 
187 ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 72; see supra Part II (examining how 
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abused child confides in him or her, to corroborate these 
statements in court in order to confirm what the child initially 
said.188 Any alteration in the criminal process that makes it more 
difficult for prosecutors to use the exception contradicts the very 
reasoning behind its adoption. 
While courts must still weed out false accusations to prevent 
a wrongful conviction, it is crucial not to let this interest obscure 
the need to protect children from sexual abuse. In addition to 
protecting the rights of the accused, the court must vigilantly 
protect evidentiary rules encouraging disclosure, recognizing the 
various reasons why children are too fearful to disclose,189 and 
assisting the prosecution of those who are the cause of such fear.  
To facilitate prosecution, courts cannot so rigidly define 
spontaneity. Instead, a totality of the circumstances approach is 
more appropriate to the determination of whether a statement is 
spontaneous within the meaning of MRE 803A. Such an 
approach maintains the efficacy of the exception, ensures that 
admitted statements are spontaneous given the context in which 
they were made, and does not serve as an additional impediment 
to the prosecution. 
 
                                                          
the difficulty in prosecuting child sexual abuse cases led to the legislature’s 
adoption of a specific hearsay exception for these cases). 
188 MICH. R. EVID. 803A(4); ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 72. 
189 See supra Part I (exploring the various reasons why children are often 
too fearful to disclose sexual abuse and the need for a specific hearsay 
exception for corroboration of child sexual abuse). 
